Former UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association (2011-17) The Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly: General principals - Former UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association (2011-17)

What is included within the notion of “assembly”?

The notion of “assembly” covers a wide range of different types of gatherings, whether in public or private places, and whether static or moving. Examples of gatherings that international courts and mechanisms have held to be assemblies include demonstrations,^{^[1]} pickets,^{^[2]} processions,^{^[3]} rallies,^{^[4]} sits-in,^{^[5]} roadblocks,^{^[6]} gatherings in privately-owned places,^{^[7]} occupations of buildings,^{^[8]} and the public reading of press statements.^{^[9]}

The UN Special Rapporteur has provided the following definition, which has also been embraced by the AComHPR’s Study Group on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa:

An “assembly” is an intentional and temporary gathering in a private or public space for a specific purpose. It therefore includes demonstrations, inside meetings, strikes, processions, rallies or even sits-in.^{^[10]}

The ECtHR stresses that the term “assembly” should be broadly understood:

The right to freedom of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society … Thus, it should not be interpreted restrictively. As such this right covers both private meetings and meetings in public thoroughfares as well as static meetings and public processions; in addition, it can be exercised by individuals and those organising the assembly.^{^[11]}

The OSCE-ODIHR Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly use similar wording, but add that an assembly must have a “common expressive purpose”:

For the purposes of the Guidelines, an assembly means the intentional and temporary presence of a number of individuals in a public place for a common expressive purpose.

This definition recognizes that, although particular forms of assembly may raise specific regulatory issues, all types of peaceful assembly – both static and moving assemblies, as well as those that take place on publicly or privately owned premises or in enclosed structures – deserve protection.^{^[12]}

What is the significance of the requirement that assembly be ”peaceful”?

Most major global and human rights instruments guarantee a right of “peaceful” assembly (see Article 20 of the UDHR, Article 21 of the ICCPR, and, at the regional level, Article 15 of the ACHR and Article 11 of the ECHR). Article 11 of the ACHPR, however, simply guarantees a right “to assemble freely with others”.

The intentions of the organizers and each participant determine whether his or her right is protected

If the organizers of an assembly have peaceful intentions, they are exercising the right to peaceful assembly.^{^[13]} This does not change if, despite these intentions, violent acts are committed by others. The ECtHR has stated:

The right to freedom of peaceful assembly is secured to everyone who has the intention of organising a peaceful demonstration. The possibility of violent counter-demonstrations or the possibility of extremists with violent intentions joining the demonstration cannot as such take away that right.^{^[14]}

The same applies to participants in an assembly; an individual whose intentions and actions are peaceful does not lose the protection of the right when others engage in violent acts. In Ziliberberg v. Moldova, the ECtHR held:

[A]n individual does not cease to enjoy the right to peaceful assembly as a result of sporadic violence or other punishable acts committed by others in the course of the demonstration, if the individual in question remains peaceful in his or her own intentions or behaviour. Although the demonstration gradually became violent, there is no indication that the applicant was himself involved in violence or that he had any violent intentions. … Accordingly, the Court concludes that Article 11 is applicable in the present case.^{^[15]}

Peaceful intentions must be presumed

The UN Special Rapporteur and the OSCE-ODIHR Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly stress that when a person exercises the right to assemble, the peacefulness of his or her intentions must be presumed, until the opposite is demonstrated.^{^[16]} The ECtHR agrees that the burden of proof is on the authorities:

The burden of proving the violent intentions of the organisers of a demonstration lies with the authorities.^{^[17]}

Moreover, the fact that violence occurs is not sufficient proof that it was intended by the organizers:

[T]he mere fact that acts of violence occur in the course of a gathering cannot, of itself, be sufficient to find that its organisers had violent intentions.^{^[18]}

That an assembly is obstructive does not mean it is not peaceful

The fact that the organizers intend to cause hindrance or obstruction to the person or entity against which a demonstration is directed does not mean their intentions are not “peaceful”.^{^[19]} In Karpyuk and Others v. Ukraine, the ECtHR stated:

[T]he organisers intended the rally to be an obstructive, but peaceful, gathering intended to occupy the space around the Shevchenko monument and thus prevent the President of Ukraine from laying flowers there. According to the Court’s settled case-law, such obstructive actions in principle enjoy the protection of Articles 10 and 11.^{^[20]}

In Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR struck a more cautious note regarding assemblies which deliberately disrupt the activities of third parties who are not the target of the protest, such as in this instance blockades of major highways. The Court still considered that the blockades were protected by the right to assemble, but signaled that a restriction might more easily pass the necessity test for interferences with freedom of assembly:

In the Court’s view, although not an uncommon occurrence in the context of the exercise of freedom of assembly in modern societies, physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life in order to seriously disrupt the activities carried out by others is not at the core of that freedom as protected by Article 11 of the Convention … This state of affairs might have implications for any assessment of “necessity” to be carried out under the second paragraph of Article 11.

Nevertheless, the Court does not consider that the impugned conduct of the demonstrations for which the applicants were held responsible was of such a nature and degree as to remove their participation in the demonstration from the scope of protection of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 11 of the Convention.^{^[21]}

Protests: an exercise of freedom of expression or freedom of peaceful assembly?

Freedom of peaceful assembly is sometimes difficult to separate from freedom of expression. Authors of communications to the Human Rights Committee that relate to protests often invoke both freedom of expression and of assembly, and the Human Rights Committee is willing to apply both rights.^{^[22]}

The IACHR has stated that demonstrations are “a form of expression involving the exercise of related rights such as the right of citizens to assemble and demonstrate and the right to the free flow of opinions and information.”^{^[23]}

The ECtHR also acknowledges that there is no clear dividing line between the two rights.^{^[24]} It considers the guarantee of freedom of peaceful assembly a lex specialis, which must be interpreted in light of freedom of expression, which is the lex generalis:

The Court notes that … Article 10 of the Convention is to be regarded as a lex generalis in relation to Article 11 of the Convention, a lex specialis … On the other hand, notwithstanding its autonomous role and particular sphere of application, Article 11 of the Convention must … also be considered in the light of Article 10 of the Convention. The protection of personal opinions, secured by Article 10 of the Convention, is one of the objectives of freedom of peaceful assembly as enshrined in Article 11 of the Convention.^{^[25]}

In practice, the ECtHR has tended to analyze certain forms of protest as exercises of freedom of expression rather than freedom of peaceful assembly. These include one-person protests,^{^[26]} the establishment of protest camps,^{^[27]} shouting slogans during a ceremony,^{^[28]} hunger strikes,^{^[29]} symbolic acts of protest (such as hanging out clothing representing the “dirty laundry of the nation”,^{^[30]} pouring paint on a sculpture^{^[31]} or burning flags and photos^{^[32]}), displaying signs or political symbols,^{^[33]} occupations of public buildings^{^[34]} and direct actions intended to block activities that demonstrators disapprove of.^{^[35]}

Restrictions imposed on an assembly must comply with a three-prong test

The right to freedom of peaceful assembly is not absolute, and restrictions may be imposed. The main international treaties guaranteeing the right set out a similar strict test for restrictions (see Article 21 of the ICCPR, Article 11 of the ACHPR, Article 15 of the ACHR and Article 11(2) of the ECHR). Under this test, restrictions to freedom of peaceful assembly are only permissible when they: (1) are imposed in conformity with the law; (2) pursue a legitimate aim; and (3) are necessary in a democratic society, meaning that any restriction must comply with a strict test of necessity and proportionality.

What constitutes a restriction?

Generally, any measure taken by the authorities that may have an adverse impact on the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly will constitute a restriction which needs to meet the three-prong test. The ECtHR has often stated:

[A]n interference with the exercise of freedom of peaceful assembly does not need to amount to an outright ban, whether legal or de facto, but can consist in various other measures taken by the authorities. The term “restrictions” in Article 11 § 2 must be interpreted as including both measures taken before or during an act of assembly and those, such as punitive measures, taken afterwards.^{^[36]}

Thus, actions such as preventing an individual from traveling to an assembly, the dispersal of the assembly and the arrest of participants or the imposition of penalties for having taken part in an assembly all qualify as restrictions.^{^[37]} The ECtHR has clarified that penalties imposed for other offenses, such as disobedience towards the police, still constitute restrictions if the penalty is in reality directly related to the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.^{^[38]}

First prong: Prescribed in conformity with the law

International mechanisms have made it clear that the first prong of the test means, firstly, that a restriction on freedom of assembly should be based on an appropriate instrument of domestic law, and secondly, that that instrument must meet the requirement of legality, meaning it should be publicly available and clear and precise enough to prevent arbitrary interferences.

Types of instrument that qualify as ‘law’

The IACtHR has stated that, in the context of legitimate restrictions on rights, the term “law” refers to

a general legal norm tied to the general welfare, passed by democratically elected legislative bodies established by the Constitution, and formulated according to the procedures set forth by the constitutions of the States Parties for that purpose.^{^[39]}

Thus, restrictions on freedom of peaceful assembly cannot be imposed through a government order or administrative decree,^{^[40]} unless the power to issue that order or decree is itself based on a law which meets the requirements stated above. The IACtHR stresses that any such delegation must be authorized by the Constitution; that the executive body should respect the limits of its delegated powers; and that it should be subject to effective controls.^{^[41]}

The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights has also stated that limitations to rights guaranteed under the ACHPR “must take the form of ‘law of general application’”.^{^[42]} The ECtHR, however, takes a somewhat different approach; it takes the term ‘law’ in its ‘substantive’ sense and not necessarily in its formal one. It allows restrictions to be imposed through lower ranking statutes (even including regulatory measures taken by professional regulatory bodies under powers delegated to them) and even unwritten, judge-made law.^{^[43]} However, the ECtHR, similarly to the IACtHR, has emphasized that where powers are given to executive bodies to restrict the right to assemble, “the law must indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of any such discretion and the manner of its exercise.”^{^[44]}

Requirement of foreseeability and accessibility

Any law regulating the right to freedom of assembly should be publicly available and clear and precise enough to prevent arbitrary interferences and allow those exercising the right to understand their duties. The Human Rights Committee has stated as follows:

[A] norm, to be characterized as a “law”, must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly and it must be made accessible to the public. A law may not confer unfettered discretion for the restriction of freedom of expression on those charged with its execution. Laws must provide sufficient guidance to those charged with their execution to enable them to ascertain what sorts of expression are properly restricted and what sorts are not.^{^[45]}

The ECtHR similarly states that laws should be accessible and their operation foreseeable:

[T]he expression “prescribed by law” in Article 11 of the Convention not only requires that the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of law in question. The law should be accessible to the persons concerned and formulated with sufficient precision to enable them – if need be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.^{^[46]}

The IACtHR^{^[47]} and the AComHPR’s Study Group on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa^{^[48]} take a very similar view.

Second prong: Legitimate aim

Restrictions on freedom of assembly must pursue a legitimate aim. The ICCPR recognizes only the following aims as legitimate: “national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”^{^[49]} The regional treaties recognise similar aims, with certain differences in wording. The Human Rights Committee places the burden on the State to specify which aim which it is pursuing:

The Committee notes that if the State imposes a restriction, it is up to the State party to show that it is necessary for the aims set out in this provision.^{^[50]}

In its General Comment No. 34, the Human Rights Committee provided clarification on the meaning of specific legitimate aims. Public order refers to the sum of rules ensuring the peaceful and effective functioning of society, while national security refers to the political independence and/or territorial integrity of the State.^{^[51]} The Joint report on the proper management of assemblies clarified specifically that “national, political or government interest is not synonymous with national security or public order.”^{^[52]}

With regard to public morality, the Committee observes that its content may differ widely from society to society. However, it clarifies that the concept of morals cannot be derived exclusively from a single tradition.^{^[53]} Similarly, the ECtHR has found on many occasions that democracy does not simply mean that the views of the majority (or the collective) must always prevail. Fair and proper treatment of minorities must be assured and abuse of dominant positions must in general be avoided.^{^[54]} Economic interests as such are equally not part of the interests as enumerated.^{^[55]}

Need for precision

There has been a growing global trend of States abusing the enumerated legitimate interests to restrict human rights by, for example, basing their restrictive actions upon broad interpretations of legitimate interests or terminology loosely related to it. On national security, the Special Rapporteur on the freedom of opinion and expression warned specifically against the

use of an amorphous concept … to justify invasive limitations on the enjoyment of human rights … The concept is broadly defined and is thus vulnerable to manipulation by the State as a means to justifying actions that target vulnerable groups.^{^[56]}

Arguments thus need to be specific; they cannot be made in abstracto or by indicating general, unspecified risks,^{^[57]} but must be made in an individualized fashion,^{^[58]} applied in the particular case^{^[59]} or with a specific justification.^{^[60]}

Third prong: Necessity in a democratic society

Under international law, restrictions on freedom of assembly must be “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of the aim they pursue.

The Human Rights Committee has explained that this implies a necessity and proportionality test:

[A]ny restrictions on the exercise of the rights guaranteed under articles 19 and 21 must conform to strict tests of necessity and proportionality and be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related to the specific need on which they are predicated.^{^[61]}

Necessity means that the restriction must not just be convenient, but must meet a compelling need which is capable of outweighing the importance of freedom of assembly. The IACtHR states:

[I]t is not enough, for example, to demonstrate that a law performs a useful or desirable purpose; to be compatible with the Convention, the restrictions must be justified by reference to collective purposes which, owing to their importance, clearly outweigh the social need for the full enjoyment of the right …^{^[62]}

Similarly, the ECtHR requires a demonstration that the restriction meets a “pressing social need”, which must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities:

An interference will be considered “necessary in a democratic society” for a legitimate aim if it answers a “pressing social need” and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient”.^{^[63]}

Proportionality means that the interference with freedom of assembly should not go further than is strictly necessary to achieve the legitimate aim. Accordingly, if the State has different ways of achieving the aim, it should choose the least intrusive measure. For example, in a case where the authorities had flatly rejected an application to hold a demonstration, the Human Rights Committee stated:

[T]he State party did not show how rejection of the request to demonstrate constituted a proportionate interference with the right of peaceful assembly –i.e., that it was the least intrusive measure to achieve the purpose sought by the State party and that it was proportionate to the interests the State party sought to protect.^{^[64]}

Sanctions for organizers or participants are restrictions and must thus strictly comply with the three-prong test

The three-prong test does not only apply to restrictions placed on an assembly beforehand or during the event, but also to restrictions – such as sanctions – imposed afterwards.

In Praded v. Belarus, for example, the author of the communication had been given an administrative fine in connection with an unauthorised protest at the Iranian embassy. The HRC held that the proportionality of that fine needed to be demonstrated:

[W]hile ensuring the security and safety of the embassy of the foreign State may be regarded as a legitimate purpose for restricting the right to peaceful assembly, the State party must justify why the apprehension of the author and imposition on him of an administrative fine were necessary and proportionate to that purpose.^{^[65]}

The starting point is that the imposition of any sanction – however minor – amounts to a restriction of the right and thus requires a clear justification. The ECtHR has repeatedly held that even sanctions at the lower end of the scale should not be imposed on participants in an assembly that has not been forbidden unless the defendant has personally committed a “reprehensible act”:

[T]he freedom to take part in a peaceful assembly is of such importance that a person cannot be subject to a sanction – even one at the lower end of the scale of disciplinary penalties – for participation in a demonstration which has not been prohibited, so long as that person does not himself commit any reprehensible act on such an occasion.^{^[66]}

Acts the ECtHR has considered reprehensible include throwing rocks at the police,^{^[67]} the incitement of inter-ethnic violence^{^[68]} and damaging property.^{^[69]} A person does not commit a reprehensible act by failing to disavow an assembly when others resort to such acts.^{^[70]} The ECtHR recently accepted that obstructing major highways in disregard of police orders may also be qualified as reprehensible.^{^[71]} The UN Special Rapporteur expressed his regret at this latter decision.^{^[72]}

If there are grounds to apply a penalty, the ECtHR will scrutinize whether the nature (criminal or administrative) and the severity of penalties of penalties is justified:

The nature and severity of the penalties imposed are also factors to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of an interference in relation to the aim pursued.^{^[73]}

The Court has warned that, even if they are not imposed in practice, high maximum fines are “conducive to creating a “chilling effect” on legitimate recourse to protests.”^{^[74]}

Criminal law should in principle not be used in response to a peaceful assembly

There is increasing concern globally about the criminalization of persons who exercise the right to assemble; a concern expressed by, among others, the UN Special Rapporteur.^{^[75]} “Criminalization” refers to administrative or criminal measures taken to sanction participants or organizers of assemblies.^{^[76]}

A number of international courts and mechanisms have made it clear that the application of criminal or administrative sanctions to organizers of or participants in peaceful assemblies warrants particular scrutiny; in principle there should be no threat of sanctions for participation in assemblies. This is true all the more of the imposition of prison sentences.

The ECtHR’s position is as follows:

Where the sanctions imposed on the demonstrators are criminal in nature, they require particular justification. A peaceful demonstration should not, in principle, be rendered subject to the threat of a criminal sanction, and notably to deprivation of liberty. Thus, the Court must examine with particular scrutiny the cases where sanctions imposed by the national authorities for non-violent conduct involve a prison sentence.^{^[77]}

The ECtHR has noted that in some legal systems, administrative law is used to punish offences that are criminal in nature. Where sanctions imposed are punitive and deterrent in nature, and in particular where individuals are deprived of their liberty, even briefly, the Court classifies these measures as “criminal”, even if they are considered administrative under national law.^{^[78]}

The IACHR has published an extensive report on the “Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders” in which it expresses its concern about the overuse of criminal law in a number of contexts, including in response to protest. In particular, it voices its

concern about the existence of provisions that make criminal offenses out of the mere participation in a protest, road blockages (at any time and of any kind), or acts of disorder that in reality, in and of themselves, do not adversely affect legally protected rights such as those to life, security, or the liberty of individuals.^{^[79]}

Disruption caused by an assembly: authorities should display tolerance

Demonstrations in a public place will normally cause some disruption to others. It is a well-established principle in international law that a degree of tolerance towards such disruptions is required from the public and the authorities.

The ECtHR has repeatedly underlined that

[A]lthough a demonstration in a public place may cause some disruption to ordinary life, including disruption of traffic, it is important for the public authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful gatherings if the freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention is not to be deprived of its substance.^{^[80]}

Similarly, the IACHR has stated:

In balancing, for example, freedom of movement and the right to assembly, it should be borne in mind that the right to freedom of expression is not just another right, but one of the primary and most important foundations of any democratic structure … strikes, road blockages, the occupation of public space, and even the disturbances that might occur during social protests may naturally cause annoyances or even damages that are necessary to prevent and repair. Nevertheless, disproportionate restrictions to protest, in particular in cases of groups that have no other way to express themselves publicly, seriously jeopardize the right to freedom of expression.^{^[81]}

The UN Special Rapporteur likewise considers that “the free flow of traffic should not automatically take precedence over freedom of peaceful assembly”;^{^[82]} the OSCE-ODIHR Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and the Study Group on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa state that assemblies are equally legitimate uses of public space as commercial activity or the movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic.^{^[83]}

The requirement of tolerance towards disruption means, for example, that authorities should show significant restraint in resorting to dispersal, including when an assembly takes place on a public street or road.

Annoyance or provocation to others is no ground to ban or move an assembly; participants should be protected

The Human Rights Committee underscores that the right of peaceful assembly is a fundamental human right that is essential for public expression of one’s views and opinions and indispensable in a democratic society.^{^[84]} Like freedom of expression,^{^[85]} the right to freedom of peaceful assembly in particular also protects the right to express a view that others will disagree with. It is the duty of the authorities to permit this and indeed to protect the safety of those manifesting the controversial view.

The case of Alekseev v. Russian Federation was lodged with the Human Rights Committee by an activist who had been denied permission to picket in front of the Iranian Embassy in Moscow to express concern over the execution of homosexuals and minors in Iran. The local authorities justified their refusal by reference to the risk of a “negative reaction in society” that could lead to “group violations of public order”. The Human Rights Committee considered there had been a violation of the right to assemble and stressed the duty to protect the participants in such an assembly:

The Committee notes that freedom of assembly protects demonstrations promoting ideas that may be regarded as annoying or offensive by others and that, in such cases, States parties have a duty to protect the participants in such a demonstration in the exercise of their rights against violence by others. It also notes that an unspecified and general risk of a violent counterdemonstration or the mere possibility that the authorities would be unable to prevent or neutralize such violence is not sufficient to ban a demonstration … the obligation of the State party was to protect the author in the exercise of his rights under the Covenant and not to contribute to suppressing those rights. The Committee therefore concludes that the restriction on the author’s rights was not necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public safety, and violated article 21 of the Covenant.^{^[86]}

The ECtHR has taken a very similar line. In Barankevich v. Russia, for example, the applicants had been refused permission to hold an Evangelical Christian service in public, on the grounds that the majority of the local residents professed a different religion and the service could thus cause discontent and public disorder. The ECtHR held that that amounted to a violation; they authorities should have taken reasonable and appropriate measures to enable the assembly to proceed peacefully:

It would be incompatible with the underlying values of the Convention if the exercise of Convention rights by a minority group were made conditional on its being accepted by the majority. Were it so a minority group’s rights to freedom of religion, expression and assembly would become merely theoretical rather than practical and effective as required by the Convention …

The Court stresses in this connection that freedom of assembly as enshrined in Article 11 of the Convention protects a demonstration that may annoy or give offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that it is seeking to promote. The participants must be able to hold the demonstration without having to fear that they will be subjected to physical violence by their opponents. It is thus the duty of Contracting States to take reasonable and appropriate measures to enable lawful demonstrations to proceed peacefully.^{^[87]}

The ECtHR has further stated that the negative attitudes of others are no reason to move an assembly out of the city center:

[N}egative attitudes of others towards the views expressed at a public assembly cannot serve as a justification either for a refusal to approve such an assembly or for a decision to banish it from the city centre to the outskirts.^{^[88]}

Assemblies concerning public figures or matters of public interest are especially protected

Freedom of peaceful assembly provides, in the words of the UN Human Rights Council, “invaluable opportunities” for a range of political, literary, cultural, economic, social and religious activities.^{^[89]}
International courts and mechanisms recognize that there is a particular risk of illegitimate restrictions when the right to assemble is used to express views critical of the authorities or other powerful interests. Restrictions in these areas are to be closely scrutinized.

The Human Rights Committee has stated, with regard to the ICCPR:

[T]he value placed by the Covenant upon uninhibited expression is particularly high in the circumstances of public debate in a democratic society concerning figures in the public and political domain.^{^[90]}

The IACHR and the Inter-American Court have

consistently held that the necessity test for limitations should be applied more strictly when dealing with expressions referring to the State, public interest affairs, public officials in the exercise of their functions or candidates running for public office, or private individuals voluntarily involved in public affairs, as well as political discourse and discussions.^{^[91]}

The ECtHR similarly underlined, in Sergey Kuznetsov v. Russia, that restrictions on assemblies on “political speech or serious matters of public interest” do a disservice to democracy and require strong reasons:

[A]ny measures interfering with the freedom of assembly and expression other than in cases of incitement to violence or rejection of democratic principles – however shocking and unacceptable certain views or words used may appear to the authorities – do a disservice to democracy and often even endanger it. In a democratic society based on the rule of law, the ideas which challenge the existing order must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of assembly as well as by other lawful means …

[T]he Court notes that the purpose of the picket was to attract public attention to the alleged dysfunction of the judicial system in the Sverdlovsk Region. This serious matter was undeniably part of a political debate on a matter of general and public concern. The Court reiterates in this connection that it has been its constant approach to require very strong reasons for justifying restrictions on political speech or serious matters of public interest such as corruption in the judiciary …^{^[92]}

In Hyde Park and Others v. Moldova (Nos. 5 and 6), the ECtHR further stressed the need to be tolerant towards criticism of public figures, even if it is expressed in harsh terms:

The applicants sought to protest against alleged harassment by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. … Even if their signs and chants were calculated to insult the Minister, he was clearly a public figure of some prominence in Moldova. In a democratic society, greater tolerance should be shown to those expressing opinions which are critical of such figures, even if those opinions are expressed inarticulately or intemperately.^{^[93]}